Aggregating Privacy-Conscious Distributed Energy Resources for Grid
  Service Provision by Chin, Jun-Xing et al.
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SMART GRID 1
Aggregating Privacy-Conscious Distributed Energy
Resources for Grid Service Provision
Jun-Xing Chin, Student Member, IEEE, Andrey Bernstein, Member, IEEE,
and Gabriela Hug, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—With the increasing adoption of advanced metering
infrastructure, there are growing concerns with regards to
privacy risks stemming from the high resolution measurements.
This has given rise to consumer privacy protection techniques
that physically alter the consumer’s energy load profile in order to
mask private information using localised devices such as batteries
or flexible loads. Meanwhile, there has also been increasing
interest in aggregating the distributed energy resources (DERs)
of residential consumers in order to provide services to the grid.
In this paper, we propose a distributed algorithm to aggregate
the DERs of privacy-conscious consumers to provide services
to the grid, whilst preserving the consumers’ privacy. Results
show that the optimisation solution from the distributed method
converges to one close to the optimum computed using an
ideal centralised solution method, balancing between grid service
provision, consumer preferences and privacy protection. While
the overall performance of the distributed method lags that of
a centralised solution, it preserves the privacy of consumers,
and does not require high-bandwidth two-way communications
infrastructure.
Index Terms—Ancillary Services, Consumer Privacy, Online
Gradient Descent, Mutual Information, Optimisation Methods,
Smart Meter, Advanced Metering Infrastructure
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the adoption rate of advanced metering in-
frastructure (AMI) using smart meters (SMs) has risen steadily
across the globe as part of grid modernisation efforts. As of
January 2017, 52% of the 150 million electricity consumers in
the US have AMI [1], while in Europe, 13 member states are
expected to have AMI adoption rates of over 95% by 2020 [2].
In Switzerland, 80% of all electricity meters are to be replaced
with SMs by 2027 [3]. AMI provides high-frequency energy
consumption measurements to utility operators, allowing for
data-driven grid management and planning techniques that
promise to improve grid efficiency and transparency. However,
this data also entails serious privacy risks for consumers, as
it reveals their detailed electricity consumption profiles. It has
been shown in the literature that lifestyle patterns, potential
illnesses, religious practices, socio-demographic profile, and
even appliances used can be inferred from AMI data through
data analytics and non-intrusive load monitoring techniques
[4]–[8].
These risks and recent developments in consumer privacy
protection laws such as the European Union’s General Data
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Protection Regulation [9], have spurred the development of
privacy-enhancing methods for consumers with AMI, which
can be split into two categories: smart meter data manipulation
(SMDM) and user demand shaping (UDS) [10]. SMDM
involves pre-processing the AMI data before it is reported,
e.g., data aggregation, data anonymisation, and data obfusca-
tion. UDS, on the other hand, entails physically shaping the
consumer demand such that the grid-visible load, i.e., the grid
load no longer reveals private information present in the actual
consumer load. This is achieved by using behind-the-meter
resources such as energy storage devices, flexible loads, and
distributed energy sources. While the former may be cheaper
to implement, they may impact the utility of the AMI data due
to the distortion in the meter readings or may require trusted
third parties, e.g, as proposed in [11], [12]. Moreover, as they
do not tackle the issue on the physical level, i.e., the actual
energy flow, it might be possible to still decipher the actual
consumption depending on the protection used [13].
One of the first UDS schemes is described in [14], where the
authors implement a best effort scheme to keep the grid load
constant. However, this has been shown to leak information
whenever there is a change in grid load [15], and has since
been followed up by more complex schemes such as [16]–
[19]. In [16], the authors propose a differential-privacy based
protection scheme using an ideal battery to mask the on/off
status of appliances while being cost-friendly. Using a model-
distribution predictive control (MDPC) scheme that balances
between minimising energy cost and a proxy for privacy loss,
the authors in [17] show that a home energy controller can
be designed to directly minimise an approximate of mutual
information between the grid and consumer loads. And in
[18], the authors propose Q-learning based privacy-enhancing
control policies using electric vehicles (EVs), flexible thermal
loads, and energy storage devices to overcome limitations in
modelling consumer load statistics. The control policies are
tested on simulated load profiles with an ideal battery and
a linearised thermal load model, and show that reasonable
privacy-cost trade-off can be achieved by combining a small
battery with EVs and an air conditioning device. The authors
in [19] derived fundamental bounds on mutual information
privacy for consumers with renewable energy sources (RES),
both with and without an infinite battery, and proposed a sub-
optimal privacy-enhancing scheme for realistic cases (finite
battery) based on stochastic gradient descent. Note that in the
absence of a battery, privacy can be enhanced through the
curtailment of the available RES production.
Meanwhile, the increasing availability of behind-the-meter
resources, a.k.a. distributed energy resources (DERs), coupled
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with the roll-out of smart grid communications infrastructure
has spurred the development of demand-side management for
smaller loads. Residential consumers, which have traditionally
been neglected due to their size, are being aggregated in order
to provide services to the grid. Residential demand side aggre-
gation (RDSA) schemes can be divided into two main classes:
direct load control, and incentive (signal) based schemes. The
authors in [20] provide an overview of incentive based RDSA
literature, and propose a multi-agent non-cooperative game
framework for integrating RDSA schemes with home energy
management systems (HEMSs). Nonetheless, limitations in
communications infrastructure remain a challenge for most
RDSA schemes [21]. One possible solution is the broadcast
of a common signal as suggested in [22], though the design
of the signal is still an active field of research; see, e.g. [23]
and pertinent references therein.
UDS privacy protection methods, by their nature, lend
themselves well to being a part of an RDSA scheme given
their inherent flexibility to alter grid load. Moreover, it is
intuitive that privacy-aware consumers with UDS protection be
considered potential DERs that can be aggregated to provide
services to the grid. However, there are only few works on
the design of privacy-centric HEMSs for RDSA schemes, with
most works focusing solely on the auction activation, or (and)
accounting mechanisms, e.g., [24]–[26]. These works employ
different cryptographic techniques in the RDSA mechanism
in order ensure privacy while being able to attribute rewards
to demand response participants, but do not provide designs
for the automated HEMSs. In this paper, we design a HEMS
for RDSA that also considers the consumers’ preferences and
real-time privacy loss, without the need for pervasive real-time
AMI metering and two-way high-bandwidth communications
infrastructure. Using an online projected gradient descent ap-
proach proposed in [27], the mechanism preserves the privacy
of consumers through UDS and omits the need for real-time
measurements from each consumer. Note that the allocation
of rewards to individual consumers is not considered in this
paper and will be left to future work.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: Section
II details the problem considered, Section III introduces the
distributed solution method, Section IV presents and discusses
simulation results and Section V concludes the paper, and
presents an outlook for future work.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION AND SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
We consider the problem of a HEMS that is part of an
RDSA scheme and is required to consider the consumer’s
preferences, and also real-time privacy-loss. Each consumer
household consists of a DER, an HEMS controller, and a smart
meter that is able to provide high-frequency measurements
locally, but unable or unwilling to provide real-time high-
frequency remote measurements to the utility provider or
aggregator. The aggregator could be a distribution system
operator or a third-party energy services provider that has the
capability to broadcast high-speed uni-directional signals to
each consumer, and is able to measure the real-time aggregated
energy consumption of its consumers, e.g., at the sub-station or
transformer. The general aggregator system setup is illustrated
in Fig. 1(a). We consider the case of the DER being a battery
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Fig. 1. System setup at consumer households and the aggregator system
in this paper, but the proposed method can easily be extended
to incorporate other DERs with convex models. Fig. 1(b) illus-
trates the system considered at each consumer household. The
problem can be framed as solving the following optimisation
program:
minimise
yl
N∑
l=1
{Λ(yl) + µlΦ(yl)}+ ρΓ(y)
subject to yl ∈ Fl, l = 1, . . . , N,
(1)
where N is the number of consumers in the aggregation, yl
and µl are the grid load and price of privacy loss for consumer
l, respectively, Λ(yl) is the consumer’s utility (preference)
function, Φ(yl) is a measure of real time privacy-loss, ρ is the
coefficient for grid service provision, Γ(y) gives a measure of
the grid service provided (e.g., target load or ancillary service
tracking signal), and y := [y1, y2, · · · , yN ]T is a vector of
consumer grid loads. The set Fl, defined by the constraints:
0 ≤ s+l ≤ s+,maxl (2)
0 ≤ s−l ≤ s−,maxl (3)
0 ≤ el + ∆t(ηls+l −
1
ηl
s−l ) ≤ ecapl (4)
yl = xl + s
+
l − s−l (5)
yminl ≤ yl ≤ ymaxl (6)
enforces the system constraints for consumer l. Here, s+l , s
−
l
denote the battery’s charging and discharging power; s−,maxl ,
s+,maxl denote the battery’s maximum discharging and charg-
ing power rating; ηl denotes the battery’s charge/discharge
efficiency; el is the battery state of charge; e
cap
l is the battery
capacity; yminl and y
max
l are the minimum and maximum
allowable grid loads; xl denotes the instantaneous consumer
load; and ∆t is the time interval between each control action.
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For the rest of the paper, Al denotes a random variable,
al denotes its realisation, bold letters a denote the vector
[a1, a2, · · · ]T, log is the base-2 logarithm, Abtc denotes the
sequence (A1, A2, · · · , At), A is the range space for variable
A, and pA(a) is the probability of A = a. The functions
Λ(yl) ,Φ(yl) and Γ(y) are described in the following.
Consumer Preferences
The function Λ(yl) can be any convex utility function that
reflects the consumer’s preferences. For simplicity, we con-
sider a function that penalises deviations from the consumer’s
day-ahead grid-load schedule, given by
Λ(yl) := ‖yl − yrefl ‖22 , (7)
where yrefl is the day-ahead planned consumption. This sched-
ule can include the consumer’s preferences on a grid visible
load profile, energy cost optimisation and battery state-of-
charge requirements.
Real-Time Privacy Proxy
Mutual information (MI) is widely used as a measure of
privacy loss for consumers with AMI [10], [15]. Let Xl ∈ Xl
and Yl ∈ Yl denote the random variables modelling the instan-
taneous consumer load and the total grid load, respectively. For
the purpose of estimating the MI, we assume that these random
variables are discrete and have finite support. In particular,
Xl = {x0l , x1l , · · · , xml }, Yl = {y0l , y1l , · · · , ynl }, where m and
n are the number of bins used to quantise the consumer and
grid loads, respectively. The MI function for discrete random
variables is given by
I(Xl;Yl) :=
∑
xl∈Xl
∑
yl∈Yl
pXl,Yl(xl, yl) log
pXl,Yl(xl, yl)
pXl(xl)pYl(yl)
,
where pXl,Yl , pXl , and pYl are the joint and marginal proba-
bility distribution functions (PDFs) of the random variables. In
order to formulate MI as a function of the next grid load reali-
sations, binary variables zl = {zijl }m,ni=1,j=1 ∈ Zl = {0, 1}m×n
are introduced in [17] to relate the grid load variable, yl
to its statistics. Given that the value of xl falls in the i-
th bin, for each value of yl, there exists exactly one non-
zero zijl representing the bin where yl falls. Using zl as the
optimisation variables, an approximation of the MI function,
I˜(zl) is then formulated as an optimisation objective [17]. A
brief summary on the derivation of I˜(zl) is provided in online
Appendix A [28]; further details can be found in [17]. Here,
we relax the binary constraints on zl, i.e. zl ∈ Z ′l = [0, 1]m×n
and allow that for each value of yl, there exists a set of non-
zero zijl within the feasible set. Define then the set F ′l as the
set of all (yl, zl) that satisfies the constraints (2) to (6), in
addition to the following constraints:
n∑
j=1
zi
∗j
l = 1 (8)
zijl = 0 ,∀ i 6= i∗ (9)
n∑
j=1
zi
∗j
l y
j−1
l ≤ yl <
n∑
j=1
zi
∗j
l y
j
l , (10)
where i∗ is the index corresponding to the given value of
xl. Constraint (10) links the grid load to its PDF estimate.
Furthermore, let Φ(yl) = I˜(zl) for any zl satisfying (yl, zl) ∈
F ′l . Φ(yl) is a quadratic form that is strongly convex for
m > 1. This can be implied from [17] by relaxing the binary
constraints and limiting the optimisation program to a single
time step and can be shown by analysing its algebraically
manipulated form (see online Appendix B [28]). Note that
Φ(yl) is only strongly convex for m > 1. Furthermore, the
gradient of Φ(yl) is bounded, thereby making Φ(yl) Lipschitz
continuous. These properties will be used later to apply the
online gradient descent method to solve (1).
Ancillary Service Provision
We consider the tracking of a target aggregate real power
load profile as the ancillary service objective, and penalise
deviations from this target profile, i.e.,
Γ(y) :=
∥∥∥∥∥
(
N∑
l=1
yl
)
− y¯
∥∥∥∥∥
2
2
, (11)
where y¯ is the target profile. This target profile can be shaped
to provide services such as peak shaving, grid balancing, and
congestion alleviation, or simply just to follow a planned
consumption profile. Note that one could also track an addi-
tional target reactive power profile in order to provide voltage
support, but this is left as the subject of future work.
III. PROJECTED ONLINE GRADIENT DESCENT
The overall optimisation problem is now given by
minimise
yl,zl
N∑
l=1
{Λ(yl) + µlΦ(yl)}+ ρΓ(y)
subject to (yl, zl) ∈ F ′l , l = 1, . . . , N,
(12)
can be solved optimally using a centralised controller by the
aggregator if real-time high-resolution SM data and two-way
high-bandwidth communications are available. However, given
that current AMI deployments are constrained by communi-
cation infrastructure bandwidths, this solution method remains
impractical. Moreover, this would also require that private
information from all consumers, i.e, their actual consumer
load, privacy preferences and day-ahead schedules, be revealed
to the aggregator, invalidating the privacy protection objective.
Therefore, we propose solving (12) using the distributed
feedback-based online gradient descent solution method pro-
posed in [27]. The algorithm replaces the coupling of the grid
load variables across consumers in (11) with the latest real-
time aggregated consumption measurement yˆ at the point of
common coupling:
N∑
l=1
yl ≈ yˆ.
Hence, only the value ‖yˆ− y¯‖22 is communicated in real-time,
and is treated as a constant when computing the gradients.
This makes (12) separable and solvable locally, overcoming
the lack of real-time SM data and mitigating privacy con-
cerns. The availability of yˆ can readily be assumed given the
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increasing adoption of phasor measurement units (PMUs), and
that transformers or busbars can easily be outfitted with a
high-frequency measurement device. The use of yˆ leads to a
lagged and sub-optimal solution at each time step. However, by
assuming that high-speed control actions can be actuated faster
than the time-varying nature of (12), the distributed algorithm
is shown to converge to a centralised solution in [27], provided
that the optimisation problem is strongly convex.
Recall that (12) is strongly convex for m > 1. Nevertheless,
we add a regularisation term ‖h‖22 with a small coefficient
σ2/2, where h is the vector of all the optimisation variables;
this ensures that (12) is at least σ2-strongly convex in all
cases (e.g., when m = 1, or when extending the algorithm to
multiple time steps). It is easy to see that ‖h‖22, which is the
sum of the squares of the variables, is separable. Accordingly,
let1 ρ = σ1/2, and
f(yl, zl) =
N∑
l=1
{
Λ(yl) + µlI˜(zl)
}
+
σ1
2
Γ(y) +
σ2
2
‖h‖22 .
We now solve the following quadratic program,
minimise
yl,zl
f(yl, zl)
subject to (yl, zl) ∈ F ′l ,
(13)
locally at each HEMS by first taking a gradient descent step:
s˜+l,t = s
+
l,t−1 − r∇s+l,tf(yl, zl) (14)
s˜−l,t = s
−
l,t−1 − r∇s−l,tf(yl, zl) (15)
z˜i
∗j
l,t = z
i∗j
l,t−1 − r∇zi∗jl,t f(yl, zl), j = 1, . . . , n, (16)
where r is the gradient descent step size, and ∇A is the
gradient with respect to A. The final solution is then obtained
by projecting the interim solution onto the feasible set, i.e.,
[s+l,t, s
−
l,t, z
i∗j
l,t ]
T = projF ′l [s˜
+
l,t, s˜
−
l,t, z˜
i∗j
l,t ]
T . (17)
Only variables zi
∗j
l are updated at each time step, with
variables zijl for i 6= i∗ being treated as zero when computing
the gradients for zi
∗j
l . Note that the actual values of z
ij
l , i 6= i∗
are not re-intialised as zero, and are kept for future time steps
in order to ensure convergence. The gradients ∇s+l,tf(yl, zl),∇s−l,tf(yl, zl), and ∇zi∗jl,t f(yl, zl) are derived from (5) and
(13), then computed by substituting for yˆ; see online Appendix
B for the details on the gradients [28].
Battery Modelling
The convex modelling of realistic batteries while avoiding
physically infeasible but optimal decisions due to simultaneous
charging and discharging remains a research challenge. There
are numerous modelling methods, e.g., using binary variables,
quadratic constraints, or penalising battery use, but they are
either non-convex, or are inapplicable because simultaneous
charging and discharging is allowed and is optimal for Φ(yl) in
some scenarios. To circumvent this issue, we assume that the
1for simplicity in deriving the gradient
battery is unable to go directly from charging to discharging,
i.e, it must go through “zero”,
(s+ > 0, s− = 0)→ (s+ = 0, s− = 0)→ (s+ = 0, s− > 0) ,
and vice versa. This is a reasonable assumption given suffi-
ciently fast control actions and limitations on certain power
converter designs.
The proposed distributed projected online gradient descent
algorithm incorporating this battery modelling work-around is
summarised in Algorithm 1. We note that the convergence of
this algorithm is guaranteed provided that the step size r in
(14) - (16) is small enough; see [27] for details.
Algorithm 1 algorithm for solving (13) at time t
1: obtain aggregated load measurement yˆt−1
2: obtain target load y¯t
3: compute ‖yˆt−1 − y¯t‖22 and broadcast to consumers
4: for consumer 1 to N do
5: obtain load forecast xl,t and battery state el,t
6: if charge flag = true then
7: compute s+l,t and z
i∗j
l,t using (14), (16) and (17)
8: if s+l,t ≥ 0 then
9: actuate s+l,t and update z
i∗j
l,t
10: else
11: charge flag = false
12: actuate s+l,t = 0 and update z
i∗j
l,t
13: else
14: compute s−l,t and z
i∗j
l,t using (15), (16) and (17)
15: if s−l,t ≥ 0 then
16: actuate s−l,t and update z
i∗j
l,t
17: else
18: charge flag = true
19: actuate s−l,t = 0 and update z
i∗j
l,t
20: update constants (aijl , b
j
l , c
i
l) used in the MI
21: approximation (see Appendix A in [28] for details)
22: advance to t+ 1
IV. NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS
The proposed scheme is tested using 1 Hz smart meter
data taken from the ECO dataset [29]. As there are only five
houses in this dataset, we emulated more consumers in the
RDSA scheme by drawing data from multiple days over the
period between 26 August and 9 September, 2012 from the
five households.
Simulation Setup
Each household in the RDSA scheme was assigned a
random price of privacy loss, 1 ≤ µl ≤ 9, to mimic
the behaviour of multiple real households. To enforce the
assumption that control actions are actuated faster than the
time varying nature of (13), we assume that the local high
frequency SM measurements have a resolution of 0.2 Hz, and
that the target grid signal also varies every 5 seconds, while
the aggregated load measurements are available every second.
Each household tracks an arbitrary day-ahead schedule, yrefl ,
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TABLE I
INDIVIDUAL HOUSEHOLD SYSTEM PARAMETERS
Real-Time PDF Estimation Sample Size, K 901
Number of X Bins, m 15
Number of Y Bins, n 15
Additive Smoothing, ε 0.1
Battery Capacity 6.4 kWh
Battery Power 3.3 kW
Battery Efficiency, η 96 %
RDSA Reserve Capacity, γ 0.15 kW
TABLE II
GENERAL SIMULATION PARAMETERS
Initial Battery State of Charge 3.2 kWh
Ancillary Service Coefficient, σ1 5
Regularisation Coefficient, σ2 1e−4
Descent Step Size, r 0.012
No. of Consumers, N 20
computed using a single multi-time step optimisation for
energy costs and MI privacy, at half-hourly resolution with
the MDPC algorithm described in [17], and on a two-tier
time-of-use energy tariff. Here, we define yˆ =
∑N
l=1 yl for
simplicity, omitting grid losses, and assume that grid in-feed
is not allowed, i.e, yminl = 0. Depending on network topology
and size, the grid losses may impact the RDSA scheme’s
performance in reality, but this is outside the scope of this
paper. The general system setup at each consumer household
is summarised in Table I. The target aggregate load y¯ is
generated using the aggregated day-ahead consumer schedules
as a base, considering total RDSA reserve capacity γ¯ = Nγ.
For ease of assessment, this is designed such that the target
load is energy neutral with respect to the aggregate day-ahead
schedule within each half-hourly interval. When generating
such a reference curve, we took into account battery losses
(max bias of 0.1% of reserve capacity), and ensured that the
aggregate reserves are sufficient to meet the ancillary service
requests approximately 99.7% of the time.
Unless otherwise stated, the simulation parameters are as
listed in Table II where applicable. For ease of comparison and
simplicity, we set aside battery energy capacity corresponding
to γ at each consumer household in their day-ahead schedules,
and assume that the battery model in the optimisation problem
is accurate. The proposed distributed algorithm (abbreviated
as Dist.POGD in this section) is compared against an ideal
centralised solution for (13), both with and without relaxing
the binary constraints on zl, by modelling it in YALMIP [30],
and solving it with the Gurobi solver. For the distributed
algorithm, we assume a persistent forecast for xl, i.e., use
the latest high-frequency SM measurement for computing the
gradient step, while using a perfect forecast for the centralised
TABLE III
VARIABLES USED IN THE OPTIMISATION PROBLEM AT TIME t
Distributed Centralised
Load Forecast xl,t−1 xl,t
Target Aggregate Load y¯l,t y¯l,t
Day-Ahead Schedule yrefl,t y
ref
l,t
Aggregate Load yˆl,t−1
∑N
l=1 yl,t
solution. Note that
∑N
l=1 yl is not substituted with yˆ in the
centralised solution. Table III summarises the information used
in the respective solution methods at time t.
Results and Discussion
Fig. 2 illustrates the target aggregate load profile, the
aggregated grid loads from Dist.POGD and a centralised
solution with relaxed binary constraints, and the total con-
sumer load. Within the specific illustrated period, the batteries
are discharging, resulting in grid loads less than the total
consumer load; but the converse can be true in other periods.
Using the parameters in Table II and the selected energy
and privacy loss prices, the Dist.POGD solution converges
close to the ideal centralised solution, as seen in Fig. 2, and
overshoots only when there is a significant consumer load
change. The performance of Dist.POGD is affected by the
choice of parameters in Table II. These parameters have to
be chosen empirically in a real system, as consumer privacy
preferences would be unknown to the aggregator.
Numerically, we evaluate the performance of the algorithms
over a period of three and a half hours (number of samples
Ks = 12600; simulate four hours, discard the first half-hour
for initialisation purposes) with the following metrics. For
ancillary service provision, the algorithms are evaluated based
on the normalised root mean square error (NRMSE) between
yˆ and y¯, given by
NRMSE :=
√
1
Ks
∑Ks
k=1(yˆk − y¯k)2
y¯mean
× 100% ,
y¯mean =
1
Ks
Ks∑
k=1
y¯k ,
and the mean absolute percentage error (MAPE),
MAPE :=
100%
Ks
Ks∑
k=1
∣∣∣∣ yˆk − y¯ky¯k
∣∣∣∣ .
MAPE gives the average of the errors at each time t, while
NRMSE emphasises large deviations from the target load,
which are undesirable, and reflects the target load tracking
error relative to the overall mean. The consumer preference
(day-ahead schedule tracking) is evaluated by computing its
normalised mean absolute error (NMAE), i.e., the absolute
error as a percentage of the maximum grid load,
NMAE :=
100%
Ksymaxl
Ks∑
k=1
∣∣∣yl,k − yrefl,k ∣∣∣ .
We used an approximate MI function in the objective function
of the optimisation problem. However, for evaluation purposes
we estimate the average MI, assuming identical and inde-
pendently distributed random variables (denoted as IID), and
stationary Markov processes (denoted as Markov), as described
in [31], [32]. Such evaluation requires the computation of
pX,Y (x, y) log[pX,Y (x, y)/pX(x)pY (y)], which in the case of
pX,Y (x, y) being zero, is set to zero to avoid computing
log 0. The Markov MI captures some of the time correlation
between the consumer and grid loads, which is neglected when
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Fig. 2. Target grid load, and aggregated grid and consumer loads
calculating the IID MI [32]. Note that while modelling the Xl
and Yl as time-varying Markov processes would yield more
accurate MI estimates, there are insufficient samples from this
simulation for its application.
Privacy risks are time resolution dependent, i.e, the resolu-
tion at which consumers are metered influences their privacy
risks [33]. Therefore, the MI is also assessed at 1-minute
resolution, given that this metering resolution is more likely
to be deployed than 1-second measurements.
In our case study, we assume that the aggregator has the
following information: the ancillary service provision signal
‖yˆt−1 − y¯t‖22, and each consumer’s day-ahead schedule yrefl .
Each consumer’s grid load on the other hand is composed of
their day-ahead schedule, deviations due to privacy-protection,
ancillary service request, and consumer load deviations from
day-ahead forecasts. Hence, the MI needs to be evaluated for
grid load profiles with the ancillary service portion removed
(denoted as GS or y′l) and the day-ahead schedule subtracted
(denoted as DAGS or y′′l ):
y′l = yl −
ancillary service request︷ ︸︸ ︷
(yˆ − y¯) y
mean
l∑N
l=1 y
mean
l
,
ymeanl =
1
Ks
Ks∑
k=1
yl,k ,
y′′l = y
′
l − yrefl .
Fig. 3 illustrates the original and adjusted grid loads for
consumer 1. Note that the ancillary service request does
not equal the ancillary service provision, and that y′′l is the
aggregator’s guess that does not reflect the actual consumer
load. The number of bins, m and n, are kept the same as
in the optimisation problem when computing the MI between
xl and yl, but n is doubled when computing the MI for y′l
and y′′l to account for the possible negative values. All else
being equal, increasing the number of bins generally leads to
an increase in the MI estimate as discussed in [17].
Tables IV and V summarise the performance of Dist.POGD
with different parameters, and the two centralised solutions.
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Fig. 3. Grid load for consumer 1
While the Dist.POGD solution converges close to the ideal
centralised solution as seen in Fig. 2, there is a deterioration
in the overall performance due to the time required for
convergence, forecast error, and the replacement of yˆl,t−1 for∑N
l=1 yl,t. The use of a persistence forecast in Dist.POGD
instead of a perfect forecast allows for a better analysis of
its performance if deployed in reality. Relaxing the binary
constraints on zl marginally improves the NRMSE, MAPE,
average NMAE, and most of the MI estimates, showing that
this relaxation does not significantly impact the performance
of the MI approximate in the objective function for a single
control action. Note, however, that this may not be true in
general; in fact, the opposite might occur. One can also see a
deterioration in privacy protection if privacy risks are assessed
at a resolution lower than the controller’s, e.g. at one minute
instead of one second. Note also that the 1-sec Markov MI
values are very small because the measure is unable to fully
capture the time-correlated privacy leakage that it was de-
signed for. The time-correlation of the load profiles is at least
5 seconds. This drawback is highlighted in [32]. Moreover,
correcting for the ancillary service request results in higher 1-
sec Markov MI, and 1-min IID and Markov MI estimates, thus
resulting in more leakage of private information. However,
further compensating for the day-ahead schedule does not
reveal additional private information (compared to y′l). This
shows that the ancillary service request signal constitutes
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TABLE IV
PERFORMANCE OF DIFFERENT SOLUTION METHODS AND PARAMETERS
NRMSE MAPE Avg. NMAE
Reference Dist.POGD 1.694% 0.7878% 4.699%
Centralised, binary 0.336% 0.295% 3.71%
Centralised, relaxed 0.322% 0.283% 3.53%
15 Consumers 2.69% 1.61% 5.42%
25 Consumers 1.51% 0.827% 4.32%
r = 0.008 2.80% 1.63% 5.13%
r = 0.016 1.56% 0.914% 4.41%
σ2 = 0 1.691% 0.7873% 4.695%
σ2 = 0.001 1.694% 0.7883% 4.703%
µl = 0 1.68% 0.777% 4.61%
11 ≤ µl ≤ 19 1.78% 0.866% 5.21%
K = 600 1.70% 0.796% 4.71%
K = 1200 1.69% 0.785% 4.69%
σ1 = 3 3.17% 2.05% 4.41%
σ1 = 7 1.65% 0.978% 4.86%
sensitive side-information, while additional information on the
day-ahead schedule may not exacerbate consumer privacy loss.
Further study on ways of incorporating the day-ahead schedule
is needed for a conclusive verdict on its privacy sensitivity.
As discussed, the RDSA parameters are setup-dependent,
and changing the number of consumers in the RDSA while
keeping all else constant affects the convergence rates and
performance. This is illustrated for 25 and 15 consumers in
Fig. 4. The choice of gradient descent step size r affects
the convergence rate of Dist.POGD; too high a value for r
leads to overshoots and instability, while too low a value
hinders convergence to the optimal solution before the problem
changes, as seen in Fig. 5. 1-Sec Markov MI increases with
larger step sizes (see Table V), showing an increase in the
leakage of time-correlated private information with larger r
values. On the other hand, the overall tracking performance
improves and IID MI decreases as the rate of convergence (and
overshoots) increases (see Table IV and Fig. 5). An ideal value
for the coefficient σ2 for the regularisation term ‖h‖22 would
result in minimal impact on the performance of the algorithm.
As seen in Tables IV and V, Dist.POGD with σ2 = 1e−4 has
similar performance to an algorithm without regularisation.
As expected, increasing σ1 reduces the ancillary service
provision NRMSE at the expense of increasing the day-ahead
tracking NMAE and most MI estimates. However, a decrease
in σ1 does not necessarily lead to a decrease in IID MI due to
a slower convergence rate (see Fig. 6). Surprisingly, increasing
σ1 could also lead to an increase in ancillary service provision
MAPE due to tracking overshoots as illustrated in Fig. 6.
Increasing µl decreases IID MI, but increases ancillary service
provision NRMSE and MAPE, and the average NMAE for
tracking the day-ahead NMAE. Changing the sample size K
in the objective function has a similar effect to changing µl
as it increases the importance of the current control action in
estimating the PDF of (Xl, Yl). However, their effects are not
equivalent as reducing K could lead to overfitting the PDF.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a distributed projected online gradient de-
scent algorithm for providing ancillary services to the grid
by aggregating privacy-conscious residential consumers was
presented. A balance between the different objectives can be
achieved by adjusting their weights. Despite minor perfor-
mance degradation when compared to an ideal centralised
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Fig. 4. Tracking performance with different aggregation sizes
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Fig. 5. Comparison between different step sizes, r
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Fig. 6. Comparison between different tracking coefficients, σ1
aggregation scheme, the proposed algorithm does not require
high-bandwidth communications infrastructure. Moreover, it
allows for the preservation of consumer privacy as the actual
consumer load does not need to be revealed to the aggregator.
Future work will focus on the provision of other grid
services such as voltage support, incorporating DERs with
uncertainty or more complex constraints, and considering grid
constraints in the optimisation problem.
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